The limits of planned obsolescence for conspicuous durable goods by Agrawal, VV et al.
The Limits of Planned Obsolescence for Conspicuous
Durable Goods
Vishal V. Agrawal
McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057, Vishal.Agrawal@georgetown.edu
Stylianos Kavadias
Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, Cambridge 30332, s.kavadias@jbs.cam.ac.uk
L. Beril Toktay
Scheller College of Business, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332, Beril.Toktay@scheller.gatech.edu
An extensive body of literature argues for the benefits of planned obsolescence, the strategy of designing
products with low durability to induce repeat purchases from the consumers, and allow the firm to sell a
larger volume. Yet, several firms avoid planned obsolescence and instead offer products with high durability.
In this paper, we offer a demand-side rationale for a high-durability product design strategy: the exclusivity-
seeking consumer behavior associated with conspicuous consumption. In the presence of consumers who value
exclusivity, we find that firms benefit from designing products with higher durability in conjunction with a
high-price, low-volume introduction strategy. A higher durability in such a context leads to greater resale
value, allowing the firm to charge a higher price and lower the sales volume to achieve the product exclusivity
valued by the consumers. This contrasts with the planned obsolescence strategy that capitalizes on the high
sales volume achieved by setting a low new product price. We also show that offering higher durability and
charging a higher price are complementary levers to respond to consumers who value exclusivity. Our analysis
unearths insights regarding the effect of exclusivity-seeking behavior on a firm’s demand and pricing. We
show that firms’ durability choice may explain the joint increase in price and demand for conspicuous goods.
Key words : Durable products; Product design; Product obsolescence; Exclusivity-seeking consumers;
Demand externalities
1. Introduction and Related Literature
Planned obsolescence is a well-established strategy utilized by firms selling durable products, where
they design products of low durability that are characterized by rapidly diminishing consumer
value over time. The adoption of planned obsolescence dates back to the early 1900’s, when Dupont
reduced the durability of early versions of nylon stockings to induce replacement (Slade 2006).
Xerox and Kodak lowered the durability of products such as photocopiers and micrographic equip-
ment by designing their core components to become obsolete faster (Borenstein et al. 1995). Planned
obsolescence still remains a popular strategy in practice (The Economist 2009). A large body of
academic literature provides support for this practice (see Waldman 2003 for an overview).
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Yet, some firms eschew planned obsolescence in favor of a high durability strategy. For exam-
ple, BMW ensures the high durability of its products with a combination of design choices, free
maintenance services and extended warranty for the first four years (BMW 2008), and even pro-
motes this feature using the tagline “holds its value like it holds a corner” (BMW 2012). Similarly,
the Swiss watch manufacturer Patek Philippe designs high durability products (Patek Philippe
2012a) and advertises: “You never actually own a Patek Philippe, you merely look after it for
the next generation” (Patek Philippe 2012b). We observe that these products are conspicuous in
nature, i.e., their ownership and use is public. Prior research in social psychology has established
that for such products, consumers may exhibit a desire for exclusivity - the more consumers own
a product, the less value each derives from owning it (Worchel et al. 1975, Snyder and Fromkin
1977, Lynn 1991, Snyder 1992, Simonson and Nowlis 2000, Tian and Hunter 2001); a “BMW in
every driveway” dilutes the value of the car (cf., Bagwell and Bernheim 1996). The seminal work
of Leibenstein (1950) dubs exclusivity-seeking consumers as “snobs.” In this paper, we pose the
following question: Does exclusivity-seeking or snobbish consumer behavior help explain why firms
adopt high-durability product design strategies for conspicuous products?
The effect of exclusivity-seeking consumer behavior on whether the firm prefers high durability
vs. planned obsolescence is not straightforward. A key factor is the dependence of the consumers’
utility on the total number of consumers who own a product (i.e., the level of product exclusivity).
Consider the impact of planned obsolescence on product exclusivity. Planned obsolescence limits
the trade on the secondary market, preventing the product from being traded to lower-valuation
consumers, thereby limiting total ownership, and maintaining its exclusivity. This suggests that
planned obsolescence should continue to be attractive in the presence of snobs. On the other hand,
planned obsolescence leads to a lower new product price and higher new product sales. This may
lead to more consumers owning the product, and this drop in exclusivity may hurt the firm’s
profits. Overall, therefore, it is not clear whether planned obsolescence is the optimal design choice
in the presence of snobbish consumers. We shed light on this question by analyzing a firm’s joint
durability and pricing decisions in the presence of snobs. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work to address durability choice in the context of conspicuous consumption.
A body of literature in operations investigates how a firm’s decisions are influenced by different
consumer behavioral traits such as forward-looking or strategic consumers (Su 2007, Cachon and
Swinney 2009, Su and Zhang 2009), social comparisons (Roels and Su 2014), hyperbolic discounting
(Plambeck and Wang 2013), mental accounting (Erat and Bhaskaran 2012), and procrastination
(Wu et al. 2014) (see Netessine and Tang 2009 for an overview). An emerging stream in this
literature examines the effect of snobbish consumer behavior on a firm’s production, rationing and
pricing decisions (Tereyag˘og˘lu and Veeraraghavan 2012, Arifog˘lu et al. 2012). We contribute to
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this literature by analyzing a firm’s new product introduction strategy in the presence of snobbish
and forward-looking consumers. Another stream of literature in operations investigates pricing in
service systems with congestion (see Hassin and Haviv 2003, Randhawa and Kumar 2008, Anand
et al. 2011, Cachon and Feldman 2011, and references therein). The effect of congestion is similar
to snobbish consumer behavior in that as more consumers join the system, they derive lower
utility. This literature focuses on pricing and capacity as two primary levers to regulate consumer
decisions under congestion (see Hassin and Haviv 2003). To affect consumer purchase behavior for
conspicuous durable goods, product design becomes relevant. In this paper, we provide an in-depth
analysis of durability choice in the presence of snobbish consumers.
Our paper is also related to the literature in operations that studies how a firm’s choice of quality,
i.e., the value of the product to the customers, is influenced by product line and architecture deci-
sions (Kim and Chhajed 2002, Heese and Swaminathan 2006, Krishnan and Zhu 2006, Netessine
and Taylor 2007, Agrawal and U¨lku¨ 2013), supply chain structure and decentralization (Xu 2009,
Shi et al. 2013, Kim and Swinney 2013), capacity investments (Chayet et al. 2011), and environ-
mental regulation (Chen 2001, Plambeck and Wang 2009). This stream of literature mostly focuses
on non-durable products and does not consider snobbish consumer behavior. We contribute to this
stream of literature by studying the effect of snobbish consumer behavior on durability choice, a
design decision that also influences the customers’ value for the product.
There is an extensive literature in social psychology that identifies the existence of exclusivity-
seeking consumer behavior and examines how these behaviors impact purchasing (Snyder and
Fromkin 1977, Lynn 1991, Snyder 1992, Simonson and Nowlis 2000, Tian and Hunter 2001). How-
ever, this literature does not focus on how exclusivity-seeking consumer behavior influences the
demand at the aggregate level or the decisions of a firm. In marketing, Corneo and Jeanne (1997),
Amaldoss and Jain (2005a,b) investigate the effect of a firm’s pricing decisions on the aggregate
demand in the presence of snobbish consumer behavior. These papers focus on non-durable prod-
ucts, and therefore do not consider durability choice. Our results offer an alternative explanation
for the unconventional price-demand relationship discussed in the context of conspicuous con-
sumption, namely that price and demand may be observed to jointly increase: Amaldoss and Jain
(2005a) show that both snobs and followers (i.e., conformity-seeking consumers) must coexist for
price and demand to jointly increase for a non-durable product. We show that this joint increase
may take place due to the change in the underlying durability choice of the firm as long as some
snobbish consumers are present. In a recent paper that is closest to our work, Rao and Schaefer
(2013) examine a firm’s pricing decisions for a durable product in the presence of snobbish con-
sumer behavior. They show that a higher quality indirectly leads to greater exclusivity through
pricing. However, they do not examine the firm’s durability choice and instead assume the product
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is perfectly durable. In addition, they do not consider the presence of a secondary market, which is
critical to the firm’s durability choice and its incentive to practice planned obsolescence. We explic-
itly investigate the firm’s durability choice in the presence of snobbish consumers and incorporate
a secondary market in our analysis.
An established body of work discusses the benefits of planned obsolescence (see Waldman 2003
and references therein). An early stream of papers in this literature compared the durability choice
of a monopolist with that of a firm in a perfectly competitive market (Kleiman and Ophir 1966,
Levhari and Srinivasan 1969, Swan 1970, Goering 1992). These papers find that a monopolist
will produce a product with lower durability than the competitive firm. Muller and Peles (1990)
extend this stream of literature by examining this question in a dynamic context and show that
the optimal durability decreases over time. Another stream of papers in this literature focus on
investigating whether a monopolist firm has an incentive to practice planned obsolescence (Bulow
1986, Hendel and Lizzeri 1999b). A fundamental insight from this literature is that when a firm
does not control the secondary market or cannot eliminate it by a mechanism such as leasing, it
benefits from lowering product durability to reduce the cannibalization of new products by used
products. As summarized by Waldman (2003) (p. 138), “The general point is that a durable goods
producer with market power wants to lower the quality of the used units.... One way to achieve this
is by reducing the physical quality of the product by reducing the durability built into new units.”
In other words, planned obsolescence is the strategy of choice for a durable goods monopolist.
Our key contribution is to show that this well-established strategy is ill-suited for conspicuous
durable goods where exclusivity-seeking behavior matters. We develop a durable goods monopolist
model closely aligned with the existing literature, and verify that, even when durability is costless,
the firm prefers to practice planned obsolescence in the absence of snobbish consumer behavior.
However, when snobbish consumer behavior exists in the market, this result is reversed and the
firm instead adopts a high durability strategy because of the demand-side effects that snobbish-
ness introduces. In particular, we identify the strength of the resale value response to a change in
durability as the primary mechanism at work. We describe this fundamental mechanism and show
that it is robust to different modeling choices for snobbishness. When durability is costly, planned
obsolescence may persist even under snobbish behavior, but only when this supply-side effect (cost
of durability) is sufficient to dominate the resale value response effect. Our results also show that
offering higher durability and charging a higher price are complementary levers in the presence of
snobbish consumer behavior. In sum, our analysis uncovers the limitations of planned obsolescence
for conspicuous products and offers theoretical support for the existence of high durability strate-
gies in practice. Moreover, our analysis identifies a new product introduction strategy specific to
conspicuous durable goods: a low-volume, high-price strategy that relies on the resale value effect
to drive profit, rather than the repeat purchase effect highlighted by the extant literature.
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2. The Model
We model the problem as a discrete-time, infinite-horizon game, where the firm and consumers
move sequentially in each period. The firm is a profit-maximizing monopolist who introduces a
durable product in every period. The quality of a new product is fixed and without loss of generality,
normalized to one. We discuss the effect of product quality on the firm’s durability choice in §4.
Each product has a maximum useful lifetime of two periods and depreciates with use. Consumers
that purchase the product derive utility from two different factors: consumption and exclusivity.
Consumers’ valuations are heterogeneous along both these dimensions.
Consumption utility is θ for a new product and δθ for a used product, where θ is the per-period
consumer valuation for product quality and θ is uniformly distributed in [0,1]. Here δ ∈ [0,1]
represents the product durability (Desai and Purohit 1998), where δ= 0 represents a product that
only lasts for one period, whereas δ > 0 implies that the product lasts for two periods and the
depreciation after one period of use is 1− δ. Thus, we have a vertical differentiation model, where
ceteris paribus, every consumer (weakly) prefers a new product over a used product, i.e., δθ ≤ θ.
This allows us to formally define planned obsolescence as δ= 0, which renders the useful life of the
product to be just one period. Without loss of generality, the size of the market is normalized to
one. A consumer uses at most one product in a given period.
Utility from exclusivity is given by −λQe, where Qe is the expectation of the total volume of
products in use by consumers in that period, and λ ≥ 0 represents a consumer’s sensitivity to
exclusivity (or “snobbishness”) (cf., Amaldoss and Jain 2005a,b). −λQe decreases in Qe and con-
sequently captures exclusivity-seeking behavior, i.e., a consumer experiences a greater disutility
from the same product as more consumers own it. Modeling the consumers’ valuation for product
exclusivity through a linear negative externality is consistent with a dating or a matching scenario
as in Balachander and Stock (2009), and yields similar insights as a model where product exclu-
sivity yields a positive benefit as in Pesendorfer (1995) and Rao and Schaefer (2013) (see §4 for
a detailed discussion). This specification also makes the implicit assumption that consumers are
equally sensitive to the presence of new and used products. Our findings are valid even if we relax
this assumption (see the discussion in §4 for details).
We model heterogeneity in consumers’ sensitivity to product exclusivity as follows: A fraction β ∈
[0,1] of the consumers (independent of θ) have sensitivity to product exclusivity (or snobbishness)
λh > 0; the rest have lower sensitivity λl, where 0≤ λl ≤ λh. Consumers with λl = 0 are referred to
as indifferent consumers.
Putting the two components of consumer utility together, the per-period gross utility of consumer
type θ of snobbishness λ from using a new product in period t is given by utn(θ,λ,Q
t
e) = θ− λQte
and that from a used product in period t is given by utu(θ,λ,Q
t
e) = δ
t−1θ − λQte. The consumers
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are forward-looking and form perfect expectations of price and product durability in the future.
Finally, the analysis uses a rational expectations framework where each consumer has the same
expectation about the volume of products in use (Qe) and this expectation is correct in equilibrium.
2.1 Sequence of Events and Specification of the Game
The firm first chooses the durability (δt), followed by the price of a new product (ptn) in every
period. The firm determines the durability of the product through the design process, which involves
several actions such as using higher performance components, more durable materials, more reliable
interfaces between those components, or better production equipment (Saleh 2008). A product
with higher durability requires a higher per-unit cost of production, denoted by c(δ) = cδ2, where
c′(δ)≥ 0.
Observing the firm’s pricing and durability decisions, the consumers form rational expectations
regarding the total volume of consumers who will own the product, and make their purchasing
decisions (cf., Amaldoss and Jain 2005a,b, Balachander and Stock 2009). We assume that the firm
can commit to its pricing decision before the consumers make their purchasing decisions (cf., Desai
and Purohit 1998, Hendel and Lizzeri 1999b). Our main results continue to hold if we relax this
assumption (see §A4 in the online supplement for details).
At the end of every period, consumers who own a product that still has useful life left may
choose to sell the used product on the secondary market and purchase a new one. Since there is
typically a large number of individual sellers and buyers in the secondary market, we assume that
the secondary market is competitive and the resale value of a used product is given by the market-
clearing price ptu. Note that although the firm does not have direct control of the secondary market,
it can indirectly influence it through the product durability and the price of the new product.
We restrict our attention to rational expectations, stationary equilibria, where ptn = pn and δ
t = δ
(cf., Debo et al. 2005, Plambeck and Wang 2009). This allows us to rule out transient effects due to
only new products being present in the first period. The time inconsistency effect is not present in
our model since we consider a product with finite durability in an infinite-horizon setting (Huang
et al. 2001). Nevertheless, our qualitative insights can be shown to hold under a two-period model
where time inconsistency is present (see §A3 in the online supplement for details). We also assume
that all information regarding the cost structures and preferences are common knowledge, and all
players have a common discount factor 0 < ρ < 1. In order to eliminate the uninteresting cases
where the business is never profitable for the firm, we assume c(δ)< 1 + ρδ.
3. Analysis and Results
In order to analyze our model, we solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game by
using backward induction. We begin by focusing on the setting where the firm faces homogenously
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snobbish consumers in §3.1 for the sake of expositional clarity. Subsequently, we generalize to the
heterogenous snobbishness setting in §3.2.
3.1 Homogenous Snobbishness
In order to focus on the setting with homogenous snobbishness, let λh = λl = λ. For a given
expectation of the total volume of products in use and the price of the new product, there are at
most three undominated consumer strategies (cf. Hendel and Lizzeri 1999a): In decreasing order
of the consumer type θ that adopts them, always buy a new product and sell the used product on
the secondary market, always buy a used product from the secondary market, and do not purchase
either product (see §A1 in the online supplement for details).
The market-clearing price for used products pu is determined by equating the supply and demand
for used products. Aggregating over consumer types that adopt each strategy yields the new product
demand Dn(pn, δ;Qe), the used product demand Du(pn, δ;Qe), and the total volume of products in
use D(pn, δ;Qe) =Dn(pn, δ;Qe)+Du(pn, δ;Qe). For a rational expectations equilibrium, we require
that consumer expectations about the volume of products in use are correct in equilibrium, i.e.,
D(pn, δ;Qe) =Qe. Let D(pn, δ) and Dn(pn, δ) denote the equilibrium quantities for the total volume
of products in use and the new product demand, respectively. It can be shown that there exists a
unique rational expectations equilibrium for the total volume of products in use, which is given by
D(pn, δ) =
2(1−pn+ρδ)
1+δ+2ρδ+2(1+ρ)λ
(see §A2 in the online supplement for details).
We next analyze the firm’s pricing strategy that maximizes its profits for a given durability level
δ. Under stationarity, the firm’s problem reduces to maxpn≥0 Π(pn, δ) = (pn− c(δ))Dn(pn, δ), where
Π(pn, δ) is the firm’s per-period profit for a given product durability and new product price. Let the
optimal price for a given δ be denoted by p∗n(δ), and Π˜(δ)
.
= Π(p∗n(δ), δ) and D˜n(δ)
.
=Dn(p
∗
n(δ), δ)
denote the profit and new product demand evaluated at this price, respectively.
Proposition 1. For a given product durability δ,
i. D˜n(δ) weakly decreases in consumer snobbishness λ.
ii. p∗n(δ) increases in δ and is independent of λ.
iii. D˜n(δ) is increasing in δ if and only if ρ> c
′
(δ) and λ> Λ˜(δ), where Λ˜(δ)> 0 and Λ˜
′
(δ)> 0.
iv. When D˜n(δ) decreases in δ, the decrease in the new product demand is lower for higher
consumer snobbishness (d2D˜n(δ)/dδdλ≥ 0).
As expected, the demand for the new product decreases as consumers become more snobbish (i)
because the externality they face increases, decreasing their net utility from owning a product. The
new product price is increasing in δ (ii) because a higher durability product offers greater utility
to consumers purchasing a new product due to its higher resale value. Substituting λ= 0 in (iii),
we see that in the absence of snobbish consumer behavior, the new product demand decreases in
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durability. This is consistent with the existing literature (Waldman 2003). A revealing finding in
Proposition 1 (iii) is that in the presence of snobbish consumer behavior (λ> 0), the new product
demand increases in durability, provided consumers are sufficiently forward-looking (ρ> c
′
(δ)), and
sufficiently snobbish (λ> Λ˜(δ)). Even when the demand decreases in durability, its rate of decrease
is moderated by λ (iv).
This contrast stems from the combination of three different effects that a more durable product
has on a consumer’s net utility from owning a new product (θ−p∗n(δ)+ρp∗u(δ,λ)−λQe) as opposed
to a used product (δθ− p∗u(δ,λ)−λQe), i.e., (θ− p∗n(δ) + ρp∗u(δ,λ)−λQe)− (δθ− p∗u(δ,λ)−λQe) =
θ(1− δ)−p∗n(δ)+p∗u(δ,λ)(1+ρ). First, the drop in the intrinsic utility from owning a used product
instead of a new product θ(1−δ) decreases in δ. In other words, a used product is a closer substitute
for the new product when the durability is higher. Second, the firm charges a higher new product
price for a more durable product, i.e., p∗n(δ) is increasing in δ. Third, the resale value p
∗
u(δ,λ)
is higher for a more durable product. The first two effects exert a negative pressure on the new
product demand, while the third has the opposite effect.
In the absence of snobbish consumer behavior, the former effects dominate the latter, and the
new product demand decreases in durability. In the presence of snobbish consumer behavior, the
magnitude of the first two effects is independent of the consumer snobbishness level. However, the
third effect becomes stronger as the consumer snobbishness increases, i.e., as the consumers become
more snobbish, the increase in the resale value due to higher durability is larger (d2p∗u(δ,λ)/dδdλ>
0). The reason for this is as follows: As the snobbishness level λ increases, the externality faced
by consumers increases, decreasing their net utility from owning a product. Consequently, only
the consumers who have sufficiently high valuations θ purchase a new or a used product, i.e., the
covered market shifts to the higher end. This implies that the marginal consumer who dictates the
market-clearing price is a higher θ consumer and therefore, has a more pronounced increase in its
intrinsic utility δθ from an increase in δ. Consequently, for a higher snobbishness level, there is a
greater increase in the resale value in response to an increase in durability. When the snobbishness
level is sufficiently high, the increase in the resale value is sufficiently large to dominate the first
two effects, and a higher durability leads to an increase in the demand in conjunction with a price
increase. When the snobbishness level is low, the consequence of this resale value response is to
slow down the rate of decrease in demand as λ increases.
Amaldoss and Jain (2005a) show that both snobs and followers (i.e., conformity-seeking con-
sumers) must coexist for price and demand to jointly increase for a non-durable product. Our result
shows that this effect can be observed for durable products even in the absence of followers, and
is attributed to the resale value response in the secondary market, which is unique to the context
of durable products.
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We now analyze the firm’s optimal product durability δ∗ that maximizes the firm’s profit, i.e., we
solve max0≤δ≤1 Π˜(δ). Recall that the firm is said to practice planned obsolescence when it offers a
non-durable product, i.e., δ∗ = 0. For the rest of our analysis, we assume no discounting, i.e., ρ= 1.
This simplifies our expressions and helps us to obtain analytical results for the design strategy.
Nevertheless, it can be shown that ρ< 1 provides similar qualitative insights.
To establish a benchmark and relate to the existing literature on durable goods, we first consider
the setting where consumers are not snobbish, i.e., λ= 0.
Proposition 2. If λ= 0, then the firm practices planned obsolescence (δ∗ = 0).
The above proposition shows that in the absence of snobbish behavior, the firm prefers to practice
planned obsolescence by making the product non-durable. The reason for this is as follows: As
discussed in Proposition 1, in the absence of snobbish behavior, the demand for new products
decreases with product durability. This negative volume effect on profit is significant enough to
dominate the positive price effect from higher durability. Therefore, the firm prefers to offer a non-
durable product. This result is similar to that from the literature on durable goods in economics,
which discusses that the firm has an incentive to practice planned obsolescence by reducing the
product durability to reduce the substitution between new and used products (cf. Waldman 2003,
pg. 138). It is also the same as that can be obtained by solving for the profit-maximizing durability
in the model of Desai and Purohit (1998).
Next we account for the effect of snobbish consumer behavior on the firm’s durability choice and
show that planned obsolescence may be suboptimal.
Proposition 3. δ∗ > 0 if and only if λ>L(c), where L(c) is increasing in c and L(0) = 0.
As stated in Proposition 3 and illustrated in Figure 1, the firm still practices planned obsoles-
cence when the consumers’ snobbishness is below a threshold, i.e., λ≤ L(c). To understand what
drives this result, we consider the implications of increasing durability on the firm’s margin and
demand. Recall from Proposition 1 that the demand can increase or decrease in the durability.
In particular, when consumer snobbishness is low (λ≤ Λ˜(δ)), the new product demand is mono-
tonically decreasing in durability. Otherwise, the demand first increases and then decreases in the
durability, where the increase in the demand is due to the resale value response as discussed before.
It can be shown that the margin pn(δ)− c(δ) locally increases in δ at δ= 0. When the consumer
snobbishness is low, the demand is locally decreasing at δ= 0 but at a faster rate, resulting in the
profit to also decrease locally. In fact, we can show that the profit in this case is convex with another
local optimum at δ= 1. The firm is in effect choosing between two locally optimal strategies: δ= 0
– a low-price, high-volume strategy, and δ = 1 – a high-price, low-volume strategy. The negative
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Figure 1 Design strategy in the presence of homogenously snobbish consumers (λh = λl = λ).
∆
*
= 1
0 < ∆* < 1
LHcL
C1HΛL
∆
*
= 0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Λ
c
Note. In panel (a), offering a durable product is optimal in the gray and black regions (defined by λ > L(c)), with
maximum durability δ∗ = 1 in the black region (where c <C1(λ) holds) and 0< δ∗ < 1 in the gray region.
externality due to snobbish consumer behavior favors the low-volume strategy except when cost is
prohibitive. This can be observed in Figure 1 where for low λ, δ∗ = 1 for low cost of durability and
0 otherwise. In contrast, when the consumer snobbishness is high, the demand is locally increasing
at δ= 0 due to the resale value response discussed earlier, resulting in the profit to increase locally.
Consequently, δ∗ > 0, i.e., the firm prefers to offer a durable product if the consumers are sufficiently
snobbish. This is clearly driven by the way in which consumer snobbishness shapes the demand
change in response to an increase in durability.
Proposition 4. In equilibrium, the optimal durability δ∗ and the new product price p∗n(δ
∗)
(weakly) increase in the consumer snobbishness λ, and the new product demand D˜n(δ
∗) strictly
decreases in λ.
Proposition 4 and Figure 2 illustrate the firm’s new product introduction strategy in the presence
of snobbish consumers. Recall that as consumers become more snobbish, the negative externality
increases, which has a negative impact on the firm’s profits. The firm would like to moderate the
higher negative externality by making the product more exclusive. The firm can do so by offering a
more durable product and charging a higher price. However, this is not optimal when the consumer
snobbishness is sufficiently low (λ≤ L(c)) and both durability and price remain unchanged as λ
increases. As the consumer snobbishness increases beyond L(c), the firm begins to utilize durability
as a lever to moderate the negative effect of a higher λ, until maximum durability. Increasing the
product durability is costly, but consumers are also willing to pay a higher price for the product
(due to a higher resale value). This enables the firm to increase the price to exploit this additional
value. In fact, the firm has an additional reason to increase the price: it makes the product more
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exclusive. If the firm increased its price to only exploit the additional value inherent in a more
durable product, one would expect the demand to remain unchanged. However, the new product
demand strictly decreases with increased consumer snobbishness, implying that the firm increases
the new product price further to benefit from the value of a more exclusive product. Thus, the
main insight emerging from these results is that offering higher durability and charging a higher
price are complementary levers to moderate the negative effect of an increase in the consumer
snobbishness.
Figure 2 New Product Introduction Strategy in the presence of homogeneously snobbish consumers (λh = λl =
λ).
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Note. In the above figure, c(δ) = 0.3δ2. Durability δ∗ and new product price p∗n weakly increase in λ and the new
product demand D˜n decreases in λ.
3.2 Heterogeneous Snobbishness
We next analyze the firm’s design strategy in the presence of heterogeneously snobbish consumers
(i.e., λh > λl ≥ 0). We denote the expression 2(1− β)(λh − λl) by d¯, which can be interpreted as
a heterogeneity measure with respect to exclusivity-seeking behavior: The more unbalanced the
mix and the larger the difference in snobbishness, the larger the value of d¯. There exists a unique
rational expectations equilibrium for the total volume of products in use, which is characterized as
follows when c(δ)< 1 + ρδ (the condition for the business to be profitable):
D(pn, δ) =
{
2(1−β)(1−pn+ρδ)
(1−β)(1+δ)+ρδ(2−β−βδ)+2(1−β)(βλh(1+ρδ)+λl(1−β+ρ(1−βδ))) if 0≤ δ≤ d¯,
2(1−pn+ρδ)
1+δ+2ρδ+2(1+ρ)(βλh+(1−β)λl) if d¯ < δ≤ 1.
There is demand for the new product from both the more and less snobbish consumers for all δ.
Both segments buy the used products if and only if δ > d¯. Otherwise, the more snobbish consumers
do not purchase a used product. The reason for this is as follows: As the fraction of the less snobbish
consumers grows (β decreases) or they become less snobbish (λl decreases), more of them purchase
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Figure 3 Design and product introduction strategy in the presence of heterogeneous consumer snobbishness
(λh >λl ≥ 0).
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(b) c= 0.5
Note. In both panels, β = 0.5 and the black region represents the parameter region (λl ≥ λh) that is not valid in our
model. Planned obsolescence (δ∗ = 0) is optimal in the white region. When 0< δ∗ < 1, both consumer types own a
used product in the light gray region, but only the less snobbish consumers own a used product in the gray region.
When δ∗ = 1 (the dark gray region), both types own a used product.
a product and therefore, the volume of products in the market increases. A higher total volume
increases the negative externality. If this effect is strong enough, i.e., d¯ > δ, the net utility of the
more snobbish consumers decreases to the point that they abstain from the secondary market.
The structural results discussed in Proposition 1 hold for the heterogenous setting (the proof in
§A2 in the online supplement is for this general setting). Analytically characterizing δ∗ when c > 0
and λl 6= λh is intractable, but we can analyze the case where durability is costless (c= 0).
Proposition 5. If λh >λl ≥ 0 and providing durability is costless (c= 0), then δ∗ = 1.
Recall that in the absence of snobbish consumer behavior, planned obsolescence is optimal. The
above proposition shows that this result is also reversed for any degree of heterogeneity in consumer
snobbishness when durability is costless. In addition, we observe consumer self segmentation in
the following manner: When d¯ > 1, the more snobbish consumers do not purchase a used product
because δ∗ < d¯ holds. Otherwise, both types of consumers purchase a used product.
Figure 3 demonstrates the results regarding the firm’s design choice for the heterogenous case
when durability is costly: The firm chooses planned obsolescence only when the snobbishness of
both consumer types is sufficiently low. Otherwise, the firm prefers to offer a durable product. When
the consumer snobbishness levels are high, the firm may even choose to offer a perfectly durable
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product (δ∗ = 1). In addition, Figure 3 depicts the resulting consumer self segmentation: When
the firm chooses δ∗ > 0, both consumer types purchase the used products only if the heterogeneity
in their snobbishness is low, i.e., λh and λl are not too different (light gray region). On the other
hand, when the heterogeneity is high (large λh and low λl), the more snobbish consumers do not
purchase a used product. Therefore, as heterogeneity increases, the less snobbish consumers have a
greater influence on the firm’s decisions, leading to lower durability. Finally, the effect of durability
cost can be observed by comparing the two panels in Figure 3. It can be seen that as the cost
increases, planned obsolescence becomes more attractive and the region where the firm chooses
planned obsolescence increases. The region where both types of consumers own a used product
(light gray region or δ > d¯) shrinks at the expense of the region where only the less snobbish
consumers own a used product (gray region or δ≤ d¯).
4. Extensions and Discussion of Assumptions
Our model captures snobbish consumer behavior through an exogenous, linear externality, and
assumes that the sensitivity to the exclusivity is the same for new and used products. We now
discuss the implications of relaxing these assumptions.
Robustness of the linear negative externality assumption. We can endogenize the exter-
nality by accounting for the underlying phenomena that lead to such consumer behavior. For
example, we can consider a matching or dating scenario as in Balachander and Stock (2009) (also
see Pesendorfer 1995), where a consumer is randomly matched with another consumer and incurs
a disutility from being matched with a consumer who owns the same product. The expected disu-
tility of a consumer θ is given by λp˜, where p˜ is the probability of meeting another consumer who
owns the same product. Since Qe is the total number of consumers who own the product and the
total number of consumers in the market is 1 in our model, p=Qe/1, yielding a linear negative
externality.
Alternatively, we can also consider a framework where product exclusivity yields a positive benefit
to consumers (cf., Pesendorfer 1995, Rao and Schaefer 2013). Consider a model where the utility
from exclusivity is given by +λ(1−Qe). A consumer enjoys a positive benefit λ if no other consumer
owns the product (i.e., Qe = 0) and there is no benefit due to the exclusivity if all consumers own
the product (i.e., Qe = 1). Note that this model also exhibits a linear utility loss in volume, similar
to our analysis, but is a positive term in the consumers’ utility. For this alternative model, our
case with heterogenous snobbishness is analytically intractable, therefore we focus on the results
for the homogenous snobbishness case. Our results in Proposition 1 (ii) and (iii) change slightly.
Under this alternative model, the new-product price increases in λ and the new-product demand
decreases in δ. Nevertheless, we find that our main results in Propositions 2-4 regarding the firm’s
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durability choice hold (details available on request). That is, when consumers are not snobbish,
the firm prefers planned obsolescence. However, the firm prefers to offer a durable product when
the consumer’s snobbishness level is above a threshold. In addition, the optimal durability and the
new product price are increasing in λ and the new product demand strictly decreases in λ.
Differential in the sensitivity to the exclusivity of new and used products. In our
analysis, we assume that the consumers are equally sensitive to the presence of other consumers
who own the new product versus those who own a used product. We can extend our model to
relax this assumption: Consider the setting where the sensitivity of a consumer to the used and
new products is different and denoted by λu and λn, respectively. The externality is then given by
λuD
e
u +λnD
e
n, where D
e
u and D
e
n are the consumers’ expectations of the total volume of used and
new products in use. Under stationarity, we have that Deu =D
e
n =Qe/2. Thus, the externality is
given by Qe(λu+λn)/2, which can be rewritten as λQe, where λ= (λn+λu)/2. It is straightforward
to then see that all our structural and qualitative insights hold in this setting.
Role of Product Quality. We now relax the assumption that the new product quality is
normalized to one and examine its effect on the firm’s durability choice. Let q > 1 denote the quality
of a new product. The per-period gross utility of consumer type θ of snobbishness λ from using
a new product is then given by un(θ,λ,Qe) = qθ− λQe and that from a used product is given by
uu(θ,λ,Qe) = δqθ−λQe. We assume that the per-unit production cost is given by c(δ, q) = cδ2+kq2.
We focus on the case with homogenous snobbishness λh = λl = λ. We find that for a given durability,
the new product demand and price are both increasing in the new product quality.
Figure 4 The effect of product quality on the optimal durability δ∗.
q
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Note. In the above figure, c= (δ, q) = 0.4δ2 + 0.15q2. The optimal durability increases in the new product quality.
It is analytically intractable to investigate the effect of product quality on the optimal durability
choice. Therefore, we conduct an extensive numerical analysis; a subset of the results from which are
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illustrated in Figure 4. We find that the optimal durability is increasing in the new product quality.
The reason for this is as follows: The intrinsic consumption utility for a customer is increasing in
the new product quality, which would imply a higher demand for the new product. The firm can
moderate the higher negative externality by increasing the durability to make the product more
exclusive. Therefore, the firm offers higher durability for a product with higher quality.
5. Conclusions
Articles in the academic literature and the business press have long argued for the benefits of
a planned obsolescence strategy that induces consumers to make repeat purchases (Bulow 1986,
Waldman 1996, Desai and Purohit 1998, Hendel and Lizzeri 1999b, Waldman 2003, The Economist
2009). While there are firms pursuing such planned obsolescence strategies in practice (Slade 2006),
others take the opposite approach and emphasize the highly durable nature of their designs. We
posit that the conspicuous nature of some product categories, where consumers value product
exclusivity, may explain this dichotomy. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first
to account for exclusivity-seeking behavior as an explanatory factor in firms’ durable product
strategies. Our results carry significant managerial implications along two dimensions:
Implications for design. We outline conditions that render a high-durability design strategy more
profitable than the planned obsolescence strategy. As in the prior literature, we find that a firm
should design products of low durability in the absence of exclusivity-seeking behavior. This
explains the planned obsolescence strategy adopted by firms like Kodak or Xerox for products such
as copiers or printers that are bought by consumers primarily based on their functionality and not
exclusivity. However, for conspicuous products, the high-volume, low-price new product introduc-
tion strategy associated with planned obsolescence imposes an indirect cost because the consumer
desire for exclusivity results in a utility loss due to the high volume. In a broad range of settings,
designing a more durable product allows for a high-price, low-volume introduction strategy that
maintains exclusivity and benefits the firm. This result provides theoretical support for some high
durability strategies observed in practice (BMW 2008, NYT 2008, 2010).
Implications for demand and pricing. We offer a mechanism that explains the unconventional price-
demand relationship that the price and demand increase jointly in the context of conspicuous
consumption (cf. Amaldoss and Jain 2005a). We show that this is driven by the underlying dura-
bility choice made by firms. In other words, rather than treating this relationship as a property
of certain product categories, we find that such ex-post observations may be attributed to the
combined effect of the underlying durability choice and the exclusivity-seeking consumer charac-
teristic. In particular, when consumers exhibit a high enough snobbishness, price and demand
jointly increase in product durability. In the absence of exclusivity-seeking behavior, this effect does
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not exist; demand decreases in durability. This discussion highlights the importance of accounting
for the different dimensions of consumer valuation and product durability in understanding the
demand implications of pricing strategies.
Finally, our results advocate a need for greater alignment between product design choices and
consumer behavior to increase the effectiveness of the product development process. They also
reinforce the importance of focusing managerial attention on consumers earlier in the design process
and using empathic design approaches to identify such latent behavioral traits (Leonard-Barton
and Rayport 1997, Thomke and Von Hippel 2002, Business Week 2004).
We conclude with a discussion of directions for future research. An interesting direction of
research is to empirically test the predictions from our model, which offer the following testable
hypothesis: A firm offers higher durability products to consumers with higher snobbishness. One
can carry out a field experiment by focusing on dealers that differ from each other based on
the durabilities of cars they sell, and the treatment would be to have some dealers indicate low
quantities of cars (which will serve as the more exclusive condition in the treatment). A difference-
in-difference analysis on the final negotiated prices while controlling for the market, dealer, and
other factors would reveal the consumers snobbishness. One can further extend this analysis by
considering the heterogeneity in snobbishness in different markets as it may differ based on differ-
ent demographic factors (such as occupational status, age, education, see Chao and Schor 1998).
Finally, a comparison of the durability of cars for markets with different levels of snobbishness
would show whether firms offer higher durability products to markets that have higher snobbish-
ness in practice. Another approach would involve testing whether cars which are perceived to be
more exclusive in practice have higher durability than other cars, using data on reliability ratings
(Desai and Purohit 1998) or used car prices (Desai and Purohit 1999) as proxies of durability.
We also focused on the setting where a monopolist firm sells products directly to end consumers.
However, some durable goods may be sold through a retailer (Bhaskaran and Gilbert 2009, 2014).
A promising direction for future research is to consider the effect of snobs on the firm’s durability
choice in such a decentralized setting, or in the presence of competition between manufacturers
(Desai and Purohit 1999). We focused on one dimension of product durability, i.e., the quality of the
used product in this paper. It remains a future research direction to consider two different durability
dimensions viz., usable and physical life, as in Koenigsberg et al. (2011). It may also be a promising
direction to consider correlation between consumer valuations for quality and snobbishness to
analyze how this influences the firm’s durability choice. Another interesting direction for future
research is to analyze a firm’s new product introduction and design strategies in the presence of
reference groups, i.e., where consumers experience a higher negative externality not only due to
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more consumers buying the same product, but also based on the identity of the consumers buying
the product (Pesendorfer 1995, Amaldoss and Jain 2008).
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A1. Derivation of demand functions
We only need to consider two-period strategies because a product lasts only for two periods. There-
fore, there are nine potential strategies: BNBN, BNBU, BUBN, BNX, XBN, BUX, XBU, BUBU,
XX. Note that in our model, holding onto a used product is equivalent to selling the used product
and buying it back. Therefore, under stationarity, the per-period net utility from purchasing a
new product (BN) is θ − pn + ρpu, that from purchasing a used product (U) is δθ − pu, and from
remaining inactive (X) is 0. The net utility from any of these actions is independent of the action
in the previous period. Therefore, any strategy where a consumer chooses an action different than
its action in the previous period is dominated. For example, a strategy where the consumer pur-
chases a new product and continues to hold onto it for the next period is dominated (cf. Hendel
and Lizzeri 1999, p. 1099-1100 for an intuitive explanation for this). This leaves only three po-
tentially undominated strategies: BNBN (always buy a new product), BUBU (always buy a used
product), and XX (never purchase a product). The net present values for these strategies are given
by θ−λxQe−pn+ρpu1−ρ for consumers playing BNBN,
δθ−pu−λxQe
1−ρ for consumers playing BUBU, and 0
for consumers playing XX.
It is straightforward to see from the net present values that consumers who play BNBN will
have higher θ than those who play BUBU, who have higher θ than those who play XX. Let
the marginal consumer who is indifferent between BNBN and BUBU, BUBU and XX, be de-
noted by Θ1(λx) and Θ2(λx), respectively. Consumers in θ ∈ (Θ1(λx), 1] will always buy new
products (BNBN), consumers in θ ∈ (Θ2(λx),Θ1(λx)] buy used products from the secondary
market in every period (BUBU) and consumers in θ ∈ (0,Θ2(λx)] never purchase a product
1
(XX). Using the derived net present value functions, Θ1(λx) and Θ2(λx) can be found by solv-
ing Θ1(λx)−λxQe−pn+ρpu1−ρ =
δΘ1(λx)−pu−λxQe
1−ρ , and
δΘ2(λx)−pu−λxQe
1−ρ = 0, respectively. Θ1(λx) =
pn−pu(1+ρ)
1−δ and Θ2(λx) =
pu+λxQe
δ . Note that if Θ2(λx) ≥ Θ1(λx), then BUBU is dominated,
leaving only BNBN and XX as the undominated strategies. Under this situation, the marginal con-
sumer who is indifferent between BNBN and XX can be found by solving Θ˜1(λx)−λxQe−pn+ρpu1−ρ = 0,
and is given by Θ˜1(λx) = pn − ρpu + λxQe.
A2. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We first begin by obtaining the rational expectations equilibrium for a
given price and product durability for our general heterogenous case.
Θ1 is independent of λx, and Θ2(λx) & Θ˜1(λx) is increasing in λx. Let Dn denote the demand
for new products and Dxu denote the demand for used products, where x ∈ {l, h}. Then Dhu =
max(β(Θ1−Θ2(λh)), 0), and Dlu = max((1− β)(Θ1−Θ2(λl)), 0). Since Θ2(λx) is increasing in λx,
we have that if Dhu > 0, then D
l
u > 0 always holds. Therefore, we can have three different cases: a.
Dhu, D
l
u > 0 (or Θ2(λl) ≤ Θ2(λh) < Θ1), b. Dlu > 0 and Dhu = 0 (or Θ2(λl) < Θ1 ≤ Θ2(λh)), and c.
Dhu = D
l
u = 0 (or Θ1 ≤ Θ2(λl) ≤ Θ2(λh)).
First, consider the setting where Dhu, D
l
u > 0, i.e., there is demand for used products from
both the more snobbish and the less snobbish consumers. The aggregate volume of products
in use is then given by D(pn, δ;Qe) = 1 − Θ1 + (1 − β)(Θ1 − Θ2(λl)) + β(Θ1 − Θ2(λh)). The
market-clearing price under this setting can be found by solving Dn = D
h
u + D
l
u, and is given by
pu =
δ(−1+2pn+δ)−Qe(1−δ)(βλh+(1−β)λl)
1+δ+2ρδ . Now consider the setting where D
h
u = 0 and D
l
u > 0, i.e.,
there is demand for used products only from the less snobbish consumers. D(pn, δ;Qe) is then given
by β(1−Θ˜1(λh))+(1−β)(1−Θ1)+(1−β)(Θ1−Θ2(λl)). The market-clearing price under this setting
can be found by solving Dn = D
l
u, and is given by pu =
δ(pn(2−β−βδ)−(1−δ)(1−βλhQe))−λlQe(1−β)(1−δ)
(1−β)(1−δ)+ρδ(2−β−βδ) .
Finally, if Dhu = D
l
u = 0, then D(pn, δ;Qe) = β(1− Θ˜1(λh)) + (1− β)(1− Θ˜1(λl)) and pu = 0.
By substituting the value of pu =
δ(−1+2pn+δ)−Qe(1−δ)(βλh+(1−β)λl)
1+δ+2ρδ in D
h
u, we get that D
h
u >
0 if and only if Qe < Qx
.
= δ(1−pn+ρδ)λh(1+δ+2ρδ)−(1+ρδ)(λhβ+(1−β)λl) , and D
l
u > 0 under this condition.
Similarly, substituting the value of pu =
δ(pn(2−β−βδ)−(1−δ)(1−βλhQe))−λlQe(1−β)(1−δ)
(1−β)(1−δ)+ρδ(2−β−βδ) , D
l
u > 0 if and
only if Qe < Qy
.
= 1−pn+ρδβλh+(1−β)λl+βδρλh+ρλl(1−βδ) , where Qx < Qy. Therefore, we can characterize
D(pn, δ;Qe) as follows: If 0 ≤ Qe < Qx, then Dhu, Dlu > 0 (there is demand for used products from
both consumer types) and D(pn, δ;Qe) =
2(1−pn+ρδ−Qe(1+ρ)(βλh+(1−β)λl))
1+δ+2ρδ . If Qx ≤ Qe < Qy, then
Dlu > 0 and D
h
u = 0 (only less snobbish consumers purchase the used products), and D(pn, δ;Qe) =
2(1−β)(1−pn+ρδ−Qe(λl(1+ρ)+β(λh−λl)(1+ρδ)))
(1−β)(1−δ)+ρδ(2−β−βδ) . Finally, if Qy ≤ Qe, then Dhu = Dlu = 0 (there is no
demand for used products) and D(pn, δ;Qe) = 1− pn −Qe(βλh + (1− β)λl).
Let σ(Qe) = D(pn, δ;Qe) − Qe. σ(Qe) is non-increasing in Qe, σ(0) > 0 and σ(Qy) < 0.
Therefore, there exists a unique rational expectations equilibrium which is given by the value of
Qe between 0 and Qy such that σ(Qe) = 0 (or D(pn, δ;Qe) = Qe). The condition for whether this
value of Qe is smaller than Qx is σ(Qx) < 0, which is given by δ ≥ 2(1 − β)(λh − λl). Therefore,
2
let d¯
.
= 2(1− β)(λh − λl) and we can characterize the rational expectations equilibrium as follows:
D(pn, δ) = Qe =

2(1−β)(1−pn+ρδ)
(1−β)(1+δ)+ρδ(2−β−βδ)+2(1−β)(βλh(1+ρδ)+λl(1−β+ρ(1−βδ))) if 0 ≤ δ ≤ d¯,
2(1−pn+ρδ)
1+δ+2ρδ+2(1+ρ)(βλh+(1−β)λl) if d¯ < δ ≤ 1.
At the rational expectations equilibrium, the new-product demand is given by Dn(pn, δ) =
D(pn, δ)/2 and is strictly positive (i.e., Θ1 < 1 or Θ˜1 < 1), which implies that both consumer types
purchase the new product. However, note that when δ < d¯, we have that Qx < Qe = D(pn, δ) < Qy,
which implies that used products are purchased only by the less snobbish consumers (Dhu = 0).
For a given δ, Π(pn, δ)
.
= (pn − c(δ))Dn(pn, δ) is strictly concave in pn for both forms of Dn
(i.e., whether δ ≤ d¯ or δ > d¯). Solving the first-order condition with respect to pn, we obtain
p∗n(δ) =
1+ρδ+c(δ)
2 for both forms of Dn. p
∗
n(δ) is independent of λh and λl, and increasing in δ.
Let Π˜(δ) = Π(p∗n(δ), δ) and D˜n(δ) = Dn(p∗n(δ), δ). D˜n(δ) is given by
1+ρδ−c(δ)
2(1+δ+ρδ+2(1+ρ)(βλh+(1−β)λl))
for d¯ < δ < 1 and (1−β)(1+ρδ−c(δ))2((1−β)(1+δ)+ρδ(2−β−βδ)+2(1−β)(βλh(1+ρδ)+λl(1−β+ρ(1−βδ)))) otherwise. It is straight-
forward to see that D˜n(δ) is weakly decreasing in λh and λl. Differentiating D˜n(δ) with respect to δ
gives that D˜n(δ) is increasing in δ if ρ > c
′
(δ) and βλh + (1−β)λl > Λ˜(δ) .= (1+ρ)(1+c(δ))+c
′
(δ)+ρc(δ)
2(1+ρ)(ρ−c′ (δ))
for δ > d¯ and λl >
˜˜
Λ(δ)
.
= 2+β−βδ(2−ρ
2δ)+c
′
(δ)(1−β)(1+2βλh)+c(δ)(3−2β+2(1−β)λh)
2(1−β)(ρ(1+ρ+βc(δ))−c′ (δ)(1+ρ−β)) for δ ≤ d¯. For the
homogenous case (λh = λl = λ), we have d¯ = 0. Therefore, D˜n(δ) is increasing in δ for ρ > c
′
(δ)
and λ > Λ˜(δ). 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let λh = λl = 0 and ρ = 1. Π˜(δ) is then given by
(1+δ−c(δ))2
4(1+3δ) .
Π˜(0) − Π˜(δ) = δ(1−δ)+c(δ)(2−c(δ)+2δ)4(1+3δ) , which is strictly positive for all δ ∈ (0, 1] and c(δ) < 1 + δ.
Therefore, δ∗ = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The firm’s profit evaluated at ρ = 1 and λh = λl = λ is given by Π˜(δ) =
(1+δ−c(δ))2
4(1+3δ+4λ) . The firm’s problem is to maximize Π˜(δ) by choosing δ ∈ [0, 1]. By solving the first-order
condition for the unconstrained problem, Π˜
′
(δ) = 0, we get four roots given by r1 =
1−√1+4c
2c , r2 =
1+
√
1+4c
2c , r3 =
3−4c(1+4λ)−
√
9+4c(−15+48λ+4c(1+λ)2)
18c and r4 =
3−4c(1+4λ)+
√
9+4c(−15+48λ+4c(1+λ)2)
18c . It
is straightforward to show that r1 < 0 and r2 > 1 for c ∈ [0, 1 + δ] and r3 is a local minimizer
because Π˜
′′
(r3) > 0. Thus, we have only three candidate solutions for δ
∗: 0, r4 and 1.
We will characterize δ∗ in the λ-c space. We begin by finding the condition when Π˜(1) > Π˜(0).
Let x1(c, λ)
.
= Π˜(0) − Π˜(1). dx1(c, λ)/dc = 2c4+4λ > 0, x1(0, λ) = −3λ/(2 + 10λ + 8λ2) < 0 and
x1(1, λ) = 3/(8+40λ+32λ
2) > 0. Thus, there is a unique indifference curve defined by c = C2(λ)
.
=
2− 2(1+λ)√
(1+λ)(1+4λ)
where Π˜(0) = Π˜(1); Π˜(1) > Π˜(0) only if c < C2(λ) and Π˜(1) ≤ Π˜(0) otherwise. The
condition c < C2(λ) can be rewritten as λ > l1(c)
.
= c(4−c)4(3−c)(1−c) . We are now going to divide the λ-c
space in three different collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive regions: c < C1(λ)
.
= 2+8λ13+16λ ,
C1(λ) ≤ c ≤ 1/2 and 1/2 < c. The reason for choosing these regions is as follows: If c < C1(λ) and
r4 is real-valued, r4 ≥ 1 and can be ruled out. Moreover, limλ→∞C1(λ) = 1/2. In each of these
regions, we will determine δ∗ from the three candidate solutions (0, r4 and 1) by comparing Π˜(0),
Π˜(r4) and Π˜(1).
3
First, if c < C1(λ), then r4 ≥ 1 and is ruled out. We only need to compare 0 and 1. We know
that Π˜(1) > Π˜(0), i.e., δ∗ = 1 if λ > l1(c) (or c < C2(λ)) and δ∗ = 0 otherwise.
Second, if C1(λ) ≤ c ≤ 1/2, then we can show that Π˜(0) > Π˜(1). Thus, we only need to
compare r4 and 0. However, r4 > 0 if and only if λ >
−6−4c+3√3√1+4c
16c . If λ <
−6−4c+3√3√1+4c
16c ,
then r4 is ruled out and δ
∗ = 0. If λ > −6−4c+3
√
3
√
1+4c
16c , then Π˜(r4) > Π˜(0) only if λ > l2(c)
.
=
3
√
1+18c+108c2+216c3−3−29c−16c2
8c(1+8c) , where l2(c) >
−6−4c+3√3√1+4c
16c . Thus, if C1(λ) ≤ c ≤ 1/2, then
δ∗ = 0 for λ < l2(c) and δ∗ = r4 otherwise.
Finally, consider 1/2 < c: If λ < 1/8, then r4 is not real valued and is ruled out. We only need
to compare 0 and 1. We can show that 1/8 < l1(c), which implies λ < l1(c). Thus, Π˜(0) > Π˜(1)
for λ < 1/8, i.e., δ∗ = 0. If 1/8 ≤ λ, then we can show that Π˜(r4) > Π˜(0) and Π˜(r4) > Π˜(1), i.e.,
δ∗ = r4. Thus, if 1/2 < c, then δ∗ = 0 for λ < 1/8 and δ∗ = r4 otherwise.
Putting all three cases from above together: δ∗ = 0 if and only if λ ≤ L(c), where L(c) is defined
as follows:
L(c)
.
=

l1(c) if c < C1(λ),
l2(c) if C1(λ) ≤ c ≤ 1/2,
1/8 if c < 1/2.
If λ > L(c), then δ∗ > 0. If c < C1(λ) also holds, then δ∗ = 1, otherwise δ∗ = r4.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let ρ = 1 and λh = λl = λ. From Proposition 3, δ
∗ = 0 for λ ≤ L(c),
δ∗ = r4 for λ > L(c) and c > C1(λ) (where C1(λ) increases in λ) and δ∗ = 1 otherwise. Since r4
increases in λ, δ∗ is non-decreasing in λ. It is straightforward to see that p∗n(δ) is increasing in δ
(since c(δ) increases in δ). Thus, p∗n(δ∗) is non-decreasing in λ. When δ∗ = 0, D˜n(0) = 1/(2 + 8λ),
which strictly decreases in λ. When δ∗ ∈ (0, 1), it is straightforward to show that dD˜n(δ∗)/dλ < 0.
Finally, when δ∗ = 1, D˜n(1) = 1−c8+4λ , which strictly decreases in λ. Thus, D˜n(δ
∗) strictly decreases
in λ.
Proof of Proposition 5. When λh > λl ≥ 0, the firm’s design problem is given by max0≤δ≤1 Π(δ),
where
Π˜(δ) =
Π˜a(δ)
.
= (1−β)(1+ρδ−c(δ))
2
4((1−β)(1+δ)+ρδ(2−β−βδ)+2(1−β)(βλh(1+ρδ)+λl(1−β+ρ(1−βδ)))) if 0 ≤ δ ≤ d¯,
Π˜b(δ)
.
= (1+ρδ−c(δ))
2
4(1+(1+2ρ)δ+2(1+ρ)(βλh+(1−β)λl)) if d¯ < δ ≤ 1.
Let c(δ) = 0 and ρ = 1. Π˜a(δ) and Π˜b(δ) are both convex in δ and Π˜(δ) is continuous at δ = d¯.
Π˜(0)−Π˜(1) = −(βλh+λl(3−β))4(1+2βλh+4λl−2βλl)(1+βλh+λl(1−β)) , which is negative for all β ∈ [0, 1] and λh > λl ≥ 0.
Therefore, Π˜(0) < Π˜(1), i.e., δ∗ = 1. 
A3. The role of time inconsistency
We can consider a two-period model similar to the one in Desai and Purohit (1998), where time
inconsistency is present. We generalize their model to incorporate the exclusivity-seeking behavior
and cost of durability as in our main model (details about this are available on request). In such
a two-period model, the firm offers new products in the first period. However, in the second
4
period, consumers who purchased a new product earlier, can choose to sell the used product on the
secondary market. Therefore, while only new products are available in the first period, both new
and used products may be available in the second period. It can be shown that there can be at
most four consumer strategies in the two-period model: a consumer can buy a new product in both
periods (by selling the old product on the secondary market in the second period), a consumer can
buy a new product in the first period and hold onto it in the second period, a consumer can choose
to not purchase a new product in the first period and buy a used product from the secondary
market in the second period (if available).
While the optimal pricing decisions can be found analytically, finding the optimal durability is
analytically intractable. However, it can be found by numerical optimization (details available on
request) and is depicted in panel b of Figure 1. By comparing the panels in Figure 1, it can be
seen that our results also hold in the presence of time inconsistency: The firm may prefer to not
practice planned obsolescence in the presence of snobbish consumers, and the firm’s optimal design
strategy is similar under the infinite-horizon and two-period models.
Figure 1: Comparison of the optimal design strategy with λh = λl = λ under an infinite-horizon
model (panel A) and a two-period model (panel B)
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A4. Alternative model where the firm cannot commit to its pricing decision.
In our main analysis, we assumed that the firm can commit to its pricing decision, which is also a
conventional assumption in the durable goods literature. Under this assumption, we imposed the
conditions for the rational expectations equilibrium before solving for the firm’s pricing decision.
We now consider an alternative assumption, where the firm cannot commit to its pricing decision
(i.e., the conditions for the rational expectations equilibrium are imposed while solving for the
firm’s optimal price (see Katz and Shapiro (1985), who also compare two such formulations in a
different context). We will show that even under such a formulation, our main result that the firm
may prefer to offer a higher durability product and avoid planned obsolescence remains unchanged.
For brevity, we focus on the homogeneous case to demonstrate this (i.e., λh = λl = λ). The above
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change in assumption does not change that there are three undominated consumer strategies and
the marginal consumers also remain the same. The market-clearing price can be found by equating
1 − Θ1(λ) = Θ1(λ) − Θ2(λ) and is given by pu = δ(−1+2pn+δ)−λQe(1−δ)1+δ+2ρδ . The demand for new
products is given by Dn(pn|Qe, δ) = 1 − Θ1(λ) = 1+ρδ−pn−λQe(1+ρ)1+δ+2ρδ .The firm’s pricing problem is
then given by maxpn(pn− c(δ))Dn(pn|Qe, δ) subject to the condition for rational expectations, i.e.,
Qe = D(pn|Qe, δ) = 1 − Θ2(λ), as a constraint, which evaluated at the marketing clearing price
is given by Qe =
2(1−pn+δρ−λQe(1+ρ))
1+δ+wρδ . Note that under this formulation, the firm’s problem is
a function of Qe, and the condition for rational expectations is solved along with the first-order
conditions for the firm’s problem to optimize pn.
Solving for the firm’s optimal price, we get p∗n(δ) =
1+δ(1+ρ(3+δ+2δρ)+cδ(1+δ+2λ+2ρ(δ+λ)))
2(1+δ+λ+2δρ+λρ)2
and
Dn(δ) = Qe/2 =
1−c(δ)+ρδ
2(1+δ+2ρδ+λ(1+ρ)) . The firm’s profit optimized at these values is given by Π(δ) =
(1+δ+2δρ)(1−c(δ)+ρδ)2
4(1+δ+2δρ+λ(1+ρ))2
. We now solve for δ∗. For brevity, we will restrict our attention to the special
case where durability is costless to provide (c = 0) and as in our main analysis for the firm’s design
strategy, we will assume ρ = 1. First, if λ = 0, there is no difference in the firm’s profit under the
two formulations, i.e., even under this formulation if λ = 0, then δ∗ = 0. Therefore, to find δ∗,
we focus on the case where λ > 0. While the profit is not strictly convex in δ, there are no local
maximizers between 0 and 1. This implies that there are only two potential solutions: δ∗ = 0 or
δ∗ = 1. Π(0) − Π(1) = −3λ(4+5λ)
4(2+λ)2(1+2λ)2
< 0 for λ > 0. Therefore, δ∗ = 1 for λ > 0. This implies
that our result that the firm may prefer to avoid planned obsolescence and offer products with high
durability is robust to our assumption that the consumers form their expectations after the firm
has committed to the new-product price. 
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